I suggest considering two planes of reference: a diagnosis of the 20-year period from 1999 to 2010 and a prospective look at the 20-year period from 2010 to 2030. As a matter of fact, when we start discussing the future of the Polish economy during the next two decades we should look back at what was done during the past twenty years. Was the jewel of regained independence taken full advantage of? What is the total effect of that period?
I think that the first period features three positive things. For one, the Polish economy adapted itself well to the world’s market economy conditions. Secondly, it withstood Poland’s EU accession in quite a good condition. And thirdly, it developed at a high rate of growth throughout.
The following phenomena were registered on the negative side. For one, the classic economic management model of capital, labour and land, or in other words an economy based on coal and pork rather than on knowledge, still prevailed. Secondly, Poland failed to create foundations for a long-term economic development based on knowledge. A comparison with Finland shows how far behind Poland is in this respect. And thirdly, no breakthrough policies were pursued to promote science and innovation. Paralysis in long-term strategic thinking and the populist nature of the state’s functioning were two other negative features of that period. I claim – perhaps exaggerating somewhat – that all governments in reborn Poland were populist, albeit at different degrees. Populist in the sense that they were thinking about the next general election rather than about the next generations.
Now, a prospective look at the 2010-2030 period. For one, the Polish economy has to adjust itself to the new global scene on which the EU’s standing in global categories is becoming relatively weaker while the United States is losing its position of the monopolistic superpower. Poland has to learn functioning in this pluralized global scene and be prepared, I think, for the fact that individual European countries will be in a sense indeed disappearing from the global map. Eventually, only the EU will remain on the global map as a big object of politics. Such a vision of events has to be taken into account. Secondly, during these next twenty years Poland is bound to make the best possible use of incoming EU funds and that is not at all an easy task to tackle. Admittedly, this inflow offers an opportunity of great progress in Poland. It is also an opportunity for building the foundations of a knowledge-based economy. But in the light of what has happened in southern Italy we should be also aware that the inflow of EU funds prompts demoralization of society and various structures interested in taking advantage of EU funds in a way that suits them best rather than in putting them to good use for general benefit.
And finally – one question – shall we overcome the paralysis of thinking within the next two decades? Will Poland be doubly marginalised in mid-21st century? Will it be pushed to the sidelines of the European Union within a globally marginalised EU? These, are of course, provocative questions although the spectre of Europe’s marginalisation on the 21st century global map is too vital a question to be ignored. Poles and their successive governments are bound to strengthening the European Union to make it a solid entity on the global scene and help prevent its marginalisation. This I think is a most essential issue we face.
It follows that the next two decades are prone to threats flowing from the global scene as well as from the internal mechanism of the Polish economy.
Professor Antoni Kukliński, PhD
Centre for European Regional and Local Studies (EUROREG)
at Warsaw University